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Abstract
The purpose of the paper is to analyse existing practices of outsourcing by firms,
and to explore new ones. Of particular interest is a comparison and evaluation of
Western (American/European) and Japanese practices, and a consideration of
possible alternatives. Use is made of transaction cost economics (TCE). First,
however, TCE is extended with a dimension of learning: an important role of
external relations in turbulent environments is to enhance cognitive competence,
in an ’external economy of cognitive scope’.
This extended TCE is formalized for an analysis of strategies to minimize risks
and maximize returns of transaction relations. Use is made of game theory to
identify feasible and stable pairs of strategies, in the form of Nash equilibria.
These turn out to include the customary practice in the West. Our interpretation
of the ’Japanese way’ can not be reconstructed as a Nash equilibrium: what we
find is a modified form where the user appropriates benefits from the supplier.
We also find a ’Third Way’, which is best in the world of rapidly changing and
complex global markets that is now emerging. Different conditions require
different forms of subcontracting.
JEL classification: D23, D83, L14, L22
Key words: outsourcing, subcontracting, buyer-supplier relations, transaction
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costs, partnerships, learning, Japanese management, spill-overs, gametheory.
Introduction
In the present paragraph we briefly discuss the literature on differences in
subcontracting in the West and Japan. This is followed by a summary of the
main theory used: transaction cost economics (TCE). That framework is
extended with a perspective of learning, with a discussion of the role of partners
for learning under present conditions of global markets and rapid technological
development. This provides the basis for a model which specifies returns and
risks for supplier and user in a subcontracting relation. Subsequently different
’possible worlds’ are defined in terms of the model parameters, and for each
world Nash equilibria are deduced. It is investigated whether these equilibria
reconstruct practices in the West and Japan and perhaps some ’Third Way’.
Many authors have reported fundamental differences in practices of
outsourcing by firms in the West (US, EU) and Japan, mostly on the basis of
studies in the auto industry. While in some respects European practice is
somewhat closer to Japanese practice, it remains more similar to American
practice. The past success of Japanese industry appears to be due to some,
perhaps considerable, extent to their supplier-user relations. See e.g: Helper
(1991), Helper & Levine (1992), Dyer & Ouchi (1993), Cusumano & Fujimoto
(1991), Dore (1983, 1986), Womack et. al. (1990), Lamming (1993). Loosely,
’Japanese practice’ is characterized by long term relations with only one or two
suppliers, governance based on trust rather than detailed contracts, high involve-
ment of supplier is design and development activities, high levels of relation-
specific investments, exchange of staff and technology, emphasis on quality and
innovation rather than price, while ’Western practice’ is the opposite. Our
attempt to describe the two forms more precisely yields the following.
The Western stereotype can be characterized as follows: ’closed’ with
respect to information exchange and ’distant’ with respect to commitment in
terms of investments. Relations are often adversarial rather than cooperative.
Outsourcing is driven primarily by considerations of cost, given minimum
requirements of quality, and hence a low price demanded from suppliers,
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regardless of the profit that is then left to them. Not only the specification but
also the design and even part of the engineering of inputs is performed by the
user, as a blueprint for production by the supplier. Control of design and quality
takes precedence over utilization of supplier competence. Transfer of knowledge
and technology to and investments in the process of the supplier by the user are
evaded. The supplier shields off information about his process and costs.
The Japanese stereotype (with respect to main suppliers), can be charac-
terized as ’dedicated’ with respect to information exchange and investment. The
prime orientation of relations is cooperative. Relations are restricted or exclusive
(single sourcing; single supply). Outsourcing is driven primarily by consider-
ations of quality, in the sense of a good fit to requirements for differentiated
products, given a maximum price. The user aims to utilize as much as possible
the capacities of the supplier. Therefore he leaves part of the design and enginee-
ring, as well as production, to the competence and often the initiative of the
supplier, and invites him to contribute to the determination of optimal specifica-
tions. This requires specific investments, particularly on the part of the supplier,
and to cover for this the user gives certain guarantees (long term contracts,
sufficient minimum volume of purchase), but then requires openness on the part
of the user concerning technology used, costs and supply to other customers, in
order to control for misuse of such guarantees (’open book contracting’). This
openness is also required for effective information exchange for cooperation in
development and production. Such openness may have negative effects on the
bargaining position of the supplier, and to cover for this, the user grants a profit
margin to the supplier, deducts this from the price he can afford to pay, thus
arrives at the cost at which the input is to be produced (’price minus costing’),
transfers knowledge, technology and staff to the user, and jointly they invest in
development in order to achieve production at this price-minus-profit cost.
As described, the forms are indeed setreotypes. Helper (1991) and
Helper & Levine (1992) showed that in the early days of the American auto
industry buyer-supplier relations were like later ’Japanese practice’, and recent
practice is returning to it, while in Japan ’Japanese practice’ may be on the
wane. To explain this, Helper argues that the type of relations is determined not
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so much by national culture or tradition as by market structure. Her argument
consists of two parts. The first part is that there is trade-off between innovation
and power over suppliers. Innovation requires utilization of suppliers’ contribu-
tion to innovation, by means of their participation in design and development,
with ensuing specific investments, exchange of staff and technology, longer term
relations, etc. (the ’Japanese form’). But this increases the dependence of the
buyer on the supplier, who can then claim a larger share in rents on the buyer’s
side. The second part of the argument is that when competition in the buyers’
market is intense, producers are forced to innovate more, which leads to the
’Japanese form’, while in an oligopoly (or a market with high entry barriers),
buyers can afford not to do that, and to maintain more and closer competitors in
the supplier market, to prevent having to share their oligopoly rents. The
historical phenomena indicated above can be explained by the American auto
industry moving from intense competition in the early days (1909 - 1904) to
oligopoly (with only Ford, GM and Chrysler), which lasted until the inroads of
competition from Europe and Japan in the eighties. The Japanese, on the other
hand, after having achieved high market power, are now tempted to lower the
utilization of supplier competence and increase competiton among them.
The first part of Helper’s argument is plausible and will be deepened in
this article. The second part is convincing from the perspective of competition in
the long term. But in the short term, during a downswing of the business cycle,
the auto industry, with its high fixed costs, is confronted with competitive
pressure to lower prices, and to achieve this by putting price pressure on their
suppliers. This has been exhibited in the recent recession and its effects on the
auto industry in Europe. Here the relation between profits and type of relation is
reversed: low profits (in recession) put pressure on buyers to put more price
pressure on suppliers and renege on longer term commitments if those are in
place. This is likely to be destructive of those longer term relations and their
corresponding prospects for innovation: trust, once broken, is likely to unravel in
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an accumulation of distrust and defection1. But due to the pressure for short
term survival in a recession this conduct may nevertheless occur. In other words:
we propose that both mechanisms obtain. If in the longer term global competi-
tion in the auto markets is to remain, and therefore ongoing innovation is
required for long term survival, those players have the best chances of survival
who have the means to resist the pressure of short term survival in recessions to
break down long term supplier relations.
While we recognize that the ’Japanese form’ is gaining adherence in the
West, and that to some extent there may be hybrids, for the sake of clarity we
will reconstruct stereotypes of ’Western and Japanese practice’.
For the development of policy of firms, nations and the EU, it is of some
importance to answer the following questions:
- How can these differences be understood: why do they arise; what is
their rationale
- Is Japanese practice indeed better?
- Should US and EU firms emulate the Japanese, and to what extent
are they able to do so, and if not, what are the obstacles
- Is there perhaps a third way, better than both US/EU and Japanese
practice
- What would be required to shift to the latter practice
From this we derive the following research questions for the present paper:
- Can we deduce generic forms of outsourcing from theory?
- How do these forms relate to differences in market structure?
- In those forms, can we recognize existing practices and differences
between the West and Japan?
- Can we find new alternatives?
- What perspectives or obstacles are there for the transition to novel, better
1 Recently, many suppliers have said that after they entered upon the building of
longer term relations with some hesitation and suspicion about the "idyllic" prospects
that were offered of "partnerships" and "co-makership", during the recession they saw
that the suspicions were correct and that they will not make the same mistake again.
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forms?
For a theoretical perspective, we will employ transaction cost economics (TCE),
but that theory will have to be extended.
TCE
Before we consider extensions and formalization of TCE, a brief summary of its
relevant points is perhaps needed. Readers familiar with TCE can skip this
paragraph. We concentrate on the main issues, discussed in TCE as developed
by Williamson (1975, 1985, 1989), and we will not at each point discuss the
criticisms and extensions offered in the literature. However, a crucial extension
will be added in the following paragraph.
TCE explains how transaction partners can get ’locked in’ to each other as a
result of transaction specific investments causing switching costs, and thereby
incur risks of opportunistic behaviour, which cannot be prevented due to
bounded rationality. These risks are part of the costs of transactions. Note that
transaction specificity, (possibility of) opportunism and bounded rationality each
form a necessary condition of these risks. For modelling this, it is straightfor-
ward to adopt a multiplicative specification: if any of the variables (specificity,
opportunism, boundedness of rationality) is zero, their joint effect is zero.
TCE has implications, in particular, for vertical transactions between
suppliers and users of goods and services. In the first version of TCE, as set out
in Williamson (1975), the central issue was whether a firm should make some
input itself, in which case it chooses ’hierarchy’ as the ’form of governance’, or
buy it from an outside producer, in which case it chooses the market as form of
governance. In this decision the costs of transaction are to be traded off against
the advantages of outsourcing. According to TCE these advantages lie in scale
advantages of a specialized outside producer, who produces for a larger market
than the needs of a single user, and market incentives arising from the need for
the supplier to maintain efficiency for the sake of survival. As a result, when
investments are highly transaction specific, the advice from TCE is: make rather
than buy, since in the case of buying transaction costs are high while specializ-
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ation advantages of an outside producer are small.
In a later development of the theory (Williamson, 1985), it is recognized
that outsourcing may be desirable even when investments are moderately
specific, and the ensuing risks involved in dependence may be controlled in a
form of governance ’between market and hierarchy’. When transactions are
sizable and frequent it is worth while to institute detailed controls in ’bilateral
governance’. In case of a smaller volume and frequency of purchase such
investments in governance are not efficient, and it is better to call in a third
party as arbitrator, in ’trilateral governance’.
The controls in bilateral governance include: reciprocal supply in which
both sides incur transaction specific investments symmetrically; joint ownership
of transaction specific investments; the provision of guarantees to the most
dependent party to ensure that the cost of one-sided specific investment is
recouped. Typically, but not necessarily, the weight of specific investments lies
with the supplier, who invests in specific machinery, knowledge, procedures,
locations in order to offer a product that is specific to the user2. Guarantees then
include: guaranteed volume, frequency or period of purchase; severance payment
in case purchase is stopped prematurely (before the investment is amortized);
posting of hostages. The relevant feature of a hostage is that it asymmetrically
carries intrinsic value for the giver but not for the receiver. Thereby its advan-
tage over a monetary guarantee, with symmetric value to giver and receiver, is
that there is no incentive on the part of the receiver to expropriate the hostage
outside the conditions under which it is given, i.e. other than to punish the
partner for defection. To the extent that a guarantee has value for both sides, the
giver will require control or counter-guarantees against its misuse. If a user
participates in the payment for a specific asset for the production of an input, or
guarantees volume of purchase, he will want to ensure that the asset is not
employed for production for a competitor.
Learning
2 For a rigorous discussion of the notion of specificity, see Nooteboom (1993b).
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Due to the force of the emerging economies in East Asia, world markets have
become more competitive. In order to escape from extremes of price competi-
tion, firms are seeking to further differentiate their products. Differentiation is
feasible only if several conditions are satisfied: in consumer demand, production,
marketing and supply. In consumer demand, ongoing individualization provides
opportunities for differentiation. In production, application of information and
communication technology (ICT) yields flexible manufacturing systems, that
allow for product differentiation by reducing set-up costs. In logistics, an
explosion of stocks, one for each differentiated product, can be prevented by
means of ’just in time delivery’, which also is enabled by ICT. But to success-
fully offer many different products to different, increasingly fragmented market
segments, one needs complex, detailed and up to date information and compet-
ence concerning those market fragments, and concerning technological opportun-
ities in the supply of inputs. Supply is complicated, in particular, by the prolifer-
ation of new materials (plastics, metals, ceramics, composites, bio materials). For
a single firm, such a detailed and fast changing stock of knowledge concerning
market fragments and supply opportunities is not ’sustainable’, as Zuscovitch
(1994) put it. One needs partner firms that are close to specific markets, and
partner firms close to specific sources, who specialize in the required knowledge
and make it profitable by sharing it with partners, in networks of partial coopera-
tion. Increasingly, it is impossible to combine product differentiation with
organizational autonomy. ICT provides the technical means for rapid, efficient,
frequent and increasingly rich communication in networks.
From TCE one can derive the argument that increased uncertainty
(concerning future contingencies) makes it more difficult to write closed con-
tracts and therefore would ceteris paribus yield less outsourcing. On the other
hand, more uncertainty would require more flexibility of switching between
sources, which would plead for more outsourcing, since there is more flexibility
in shifting outside supplier relations than investing and divesting internal supply
departments, even if outside relations are of the ’Japanese type’. If the main
objective is innovation, there is an argument from Langlois and Robertson
(1989, quoted in Helper, 1991: 796) that vertical integration favours innovation
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because it promotes communication. Helper (1991: 797) objected that: "Whereas
a systemic rearrangement of the production process benefits from vertical
integration, product innovation may benefit from decentralization, which gives
access to a multiplicity of ideas". Nooteboom (1992, 1995) argued that effective
learning between partners requires a balance between cognitive proximity, which
is required for understanding, and cognitive distance, which is required for
novelty. Here, ’cognitive distance’ involves not only spatial and organizational
proximity but also proximity in language, objectives, norms, and the like. One
can have large cognitive distance at short spatial distance or within an organiz-
ation. In view of the central importance of learning, let us consider the issue a
little more deeply.
The lack of a dynamic perspective on the role of transaction relations in
learning and innovation in TCE is a fundamental shortcoming (Nooteboom,
1992). Williamson himself (1985, p.143-144) granted that from a dynamic
perspective Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) requires further development: "..
the study of economic organisation in a regime of rapid innovation poses much
more difficult issues than those addressed here ... New hybrid forms of organi-
sation may appear in response to such a condition ... Much more study of the
relations between organisation and innovation is needed". Since at present
business is labouring under such a regime of rapid innovation, such progress in
TCE is of some importance. Since innovation entails change of knowledge, an
adequate dynamic theory of transactions requires a theory of knowledge and
learning. Thus, we must consider the role of transaction relations in the change
of knowledge.
Nooteboom (1992) indicated the need to cooperate with partners from a
constructivist epistemological perspective. Epistemological subjects perform
cognition, which consists of perception, interpretation and evaluation, on the
basis of categories which they have developed on the basis of interaction with
their physical and social environment. By consequence, cognition is path-
dependent and to some extent idiosyncratic. Cognition varies across subjects to
the extent that they have developed their categories in different environments.
Conversely: cognition will be more uniform in stable, shared environments. In
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present conditions of rapid technological and market change cognitions vary
considerably.
You cannot react to opportunities and threats if your categories are not
fit to deal with them. Thus firms may make rather than buy inputs simply
because no external firm has the proper ability to acquire the necessary compet-
ence, and conversely firms may have to buy rather than make because they
themselves lack such ability. In the short term competence may be bought by
taking over a firm, but then there is a risk of a break-down of the acquired
competence when it is adjusted to fit in the firm that does the take-over. From
the constructivist view, the merging of different firms entails a possibly very
difficult integration of different categorial systems. There may be an impossibil-
ity here which is comparable to the impossibility of crossing different species,
arising from different evolutionary paths. This is reflected in the experience that
many mergers and acquisitions fail.
In fact, a whole new dimension is added to the existence of the firm and
the value of external partners. Due to increased volatility of technology and
markets firms need to focus more on core competencies (Prahalad & Hamel,
1990). In order to be effective, one needs a focus of cognition and action. Trying
to see, understand and do everything yields inaction and certain defeat in the
market. Quite apart from transaction costs, a firm is needed to function as a
focusing device. The problem of such a focus is, however, that one is in danger
of missing out on the perception and interpretation of relevant threats and
opportunities. Thus one needs outside partners, with a different but complemen-
tary categorial apparatus, to pick up and translate relevant developments, as a
form of external intelligence.
In other words, after Williamson’s argument, following Commons (1934), that
we should take transaction as the basic unit of analysis, I proposed that in view
of the importance of innovation we may now have to consider perception (and
interpretation and evaluation) as the basic unit. Firms are needed to focus and
thereby limit perceptions in order to produce action; transactions between firms
serve to complement limited perceptions.
The crux of the argument lies in what could appropriately be called
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’external economy of cognitive scope’ (EECS):
Level of competence is enhanced if at least two different entities connect
their activities, on the basis of different, complementary cognitive
abilities.
Learning may take four different forms. The first results from engaging in
transactions with multiple partners, which generates varied experience, even if
the partners do not actively engage in transfer of competence to the focal agent.
The second is that the focal agent learns by transfer of competence from his
partner, which operates regardless of whether transfer is reciprocal: one benefits
from transfer from the partner even if one does not transfer one’s own know-
how to him. The third form is more varied learning by transfer from the partner
when the partner in his turn derives competence from various other sources, in a
network which may include competitors of the focal agent. One may need
intermediate linkages to bridge a large cognitive distance. The fourth form
results from joint development with the partner: one benefits only if one also
contributes. In contrast with the other forms, the fourth form is not subject to
problems of free riding (Nooteboom, 1995).
AS noted in the literature (see e.g. Williamson, 1991), information or
technology transfer also entails a risk. This risk is that through the contact with a
supplier or customer competitive advantage in the form of proprietary knowledge
or technology may indirectly ’spill over’ to competitors. The risk is greater to
the extent that knowledge consists of codified information, and smaller to the
extent that it is tacit. However, even in the case of tacit knowledge, spill-over
may occur if cooperation entails that specialist teams are stationed at the
partner’s location. Transfer of competence requires control of this risk. The size
of this risk depends on the pattern of the network of relations in which a firm is
embedded. In particular, spill-over risk is higher to the extent that your partner
has multiple partners who might be your competitors.
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Specification of returns
Transactions yield value, in the form of returns from exchange, and carry risks,
of ’hold up’ (due to dependence incurred as a result of specific assets) and spill-
overs. For the purpose of our exploration of generic forms of subcontracting, we
make specifications for boundary cases, in terms of dichotomous variables:
whether or not the user engages in price-minus costing (PMCOS); whether or
not the supplier engages in open-book contracting (OPEN) and specific invest-
ments (SPEC); whether or not there are multiple suppliers (MULSUP) for the
user and muliple customers for the supplier (MULCUS); and whether or not the
user transfers knowledge to the supplier (UTRAN) and vice versa (STRAN). In
these dichotomous variables 1 indicates ’yes’ and 0 ’no’.
An important side condition must be mentioned:
one cannot have information transfer without openness. In other words:
STRAN = 1 implies OPEN = 1. (1)
We normalize the surplus of exchange at 2 for a standard product, i.e. if it is not
tailored to the specific demand of the user, and is produced at the volume
required for the user. In this case each side will obtain a return of 1 if the
surplus is distributed equally. Deviations from this ’focal point’ depend on
bargaining positions, which are determined by price-minus costing, open-book
contracting and access to alternative transaction partners, as will be explained
below. If scale effects are important, both sides obtain additional benefits when
the supplier produces at a larger volume. This requires that assets are non-
specific (can be used for production for other customers) (SPEC = 0) and that
there are multiple users (MULCUS = 1). If product differentiation is important,
both sides obtain additional benefit when there is specificity of supplier assets
(which is assumed to be required for differentiated products) (SPEC = 1)3. In
other words: we are creating a choice between specialized production for a
3 The implicit assumption is that specific (i.e. differentiated) products require specific
investments on the part of the supplier. Nooteboom (1993a) shows that the two don’t
necessarily go together. However, they typically do, and it is then that interesting,
problematic issues of governance arise.
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differentiated product and large scale production for a standard product.
Having multiple partners (MULCUS; MULSUP) can yield benefits for several
reasons: better bargaining position (as already indicated) and greater flexibility,
due to opportunities to switch between partners, spread of risks and learning
from varied transactions. Learning from a partner is much enhanced when he
actively contributes to the transfer of competence (’transfer’: STRAN or UTRAN
= 1). When variety of sources of information is important, the utility of the
sources is increased to the extent that the source itself has multiple partners
(’varied learning’: STRAN.MULCUS = 1; UTRAN.MULSUP = 1). A yet more
intensive form of learning arises when the two partners jointly produce compet-
ence (’joint development’: STRAN.UTRAN = 1). Next to these positive benefits,
transfer of competence carries risk of spillover: the risk that through the partner
information or competence spills over to a competitor. This can happen only if
the partner himself has multiple partners (’spill-over’: STRAN.MULSUP = 1;
UTRAN.MULCUS = 1).
With respect to bargaining position we choose an asymmetrical specifi-
cation: only the supplier risks loss of bargaining position and hence share of the
surplus due to being open (’open book contracting’; OPEN = 1). This risk can
be eliminated by the user (U) granting a profit margin to S (’price-minus
costing’; PMCOS = 1), or by the supplier by keeping access to multiple cus-
tomers (to create a credible threat of switching to another customer; MULCUS =
1). The size of this risk is indicated by the parameter b. If S has strong and
unique competencies to offer, b is small or zero.
The inclusion of all these effects yields the following specification, under
side condition (1):
for the supplier:
SRET = 1 - b(1-PMCOS).OPEN.(1-MULCUS) bargaining
+ sS.(1-SPEC).MULCUS scale
+ dS.SPEC specific product
+ mS.MULCUS multiple partners
+ tS.URAN transfer
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+ vS.UTRAN.MULSUP varied learning
+ jS.UTRAN.STRAN joint development
- rS.STRAN.MULSUP spill-over risk
(2)
where: SRET = return for the supplier
b<1, sS, dS, mS, tS, vS, jS and rS are coëfficients indicating the weights
of the several components of returns to the supplier
For the user:
URET = 1 + b(1-PMCOS).OPEN.(1-MULCUS) bargaining
+ sU.(1-SPEC).MULCUS scale
+ dU.SPEC differentiated product
+ mU.MULSUP multiple partners
+ tU,STRAN transfer
+ vU.STRAN.MULCUS varied learning
+ jU.UTRAN.STRAN joint development
- rS.UTRAN.MULCUS spill-over risk
(3)
where: URET = return for the user
The subscript U refers to the user
When the coefficients are used without subscripts (S, U), they refer to both
partners.
The items of ’transfer, varied learning and joint development’ represent a
specification of the concept of ’external economy of cognitive scope’ (EECS)
that we developed before.
Concerning the risk of spill-over, note that spill-over can be blocked by
exclusive relations: by requiring the partner not to engage in other contacts for
the same product. Note that even when there is no direct linkage of one’s partner
to one’s competitors, information might still spill over to competitors through
other linkages, such as through a supplier in a different but related market, or a
customer of the customer, who is strongly linked to a competitor. But at least
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direct spill-over is blocked: it will take longer for information to reach a
competitor, and in the longer process of transmission there is more attrition of
meaning (i.e. distortion through interpretation in different categorial systems) and
a greater chance of obsolescence.
Hold-up risk
Next to risks in bargaining and risk of spill-over, transactions entail the ’hold-
up’risk familiar from TCE, as a result of specific investments, in the form of:
- loss of specific assets , to the extent that one participates in their finance
- payment of guarantees, or loss of hostages committed to protect specific
assets of the partner
- loss due to pressure to compromise on cost, price or quality, due to
opportunism which preys on dependence created by unprotected specific
assets.
This risk arises for S if he engages in specific investments (SPEC = 1) and U
neither participates in ownership nor gives guarantees (PART+GUAR = 0). It
arises for U if he participates/guarantees, while S does not provide openness for
U to control for misuse of ownership or guarantees (OPEN = 0).
In our formalization we take boundedness of rationality for granted,
under all conditions, so that it need not be indicated. Opportunism, however,
although its presence, latency or absence is difficult to identify prior to a
relationship, need not always obtain, and may be identifiable to some extent on
the basis of experience with a relation or public reputation.
We focus on the characteristic case of user-supplier relations, where the
user produces a differentiated product, and in order to provide high quality of
adjustment to user needs the supplier needs to conduct more specific investments
than the user. Note that the user may also need to make specific adjustments, to
receive the product or to contribute to its development. We assume that the size
of these specific investments is much less than those for the supplier. Note also
that even if the user requires no specific investments at all, specificity of invest-
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ment on the part of the supplier also makes the user dependent to some extent: if
supply is discontinued, the user will incur loss of quality, because he has to buy
a substitute that conforms less closely to specifications, or higher cost, because
conformance to specifications requires purchase at a more expensive source, or
delay, because a substitute source first needs to invest to conform to specifica-
tions, or some combination of these. However, typically this risk is smaller than
the risk of loss of investment and switching costs faced by the supplier. If
symmetry of specific investments does occur, the problem of the risk of hold-up
becomes much less because there is a threat of retaliation. So it is both more
realistic and more interesting to assume asymmetry in the form of larger specific
investments on the part of the supplier.
Unlike risks of bargaining and spill-over, hold-up risk has not been
incorporated as a cost in the functions of return (2,3). The reason for this is that
it appears to be of a different order, in the sense that firms generally seem
unwilling to run any sizeable hold-up risk, at any level of returns. In other
words: they do not want to submit to possible opportunism of the partner as a
result of dependence ensuing from specific investments. We will, however, also
consider the situation of trust: agents accept the risk of hold-up, on basis of the
belief that hold-up will not occur.
The following specification of hold-up risk appears to capture the main
issues, derived from TCE
For the supplier:
SR = [{1-(PART+GUAR)}.SPEC].UOPP specificity risk (4)
where: SR = supplier risk
PART+GUAR = indicator whether the user participates in the payment
for specific investments4 (PART) or gives guarantees for return on
4 We assume that in the case that the user participates in the payment for a specific
asset, the supplier retains the power to dispose of the asset, even if the user pays 100%.
Otherwise the supplier may again incur a serious risk in that the user could at any
moment withdraw the specific asset to employ it elsewhere (Cf. Semlinger, 1991). This
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specific investments is guaranteed by the user (including the supply of
hostages) (GUAR)
UOPP = indicator of opportunism on the part of the user
For the user:
UR = [(PART+GUAR).SPEC.(1-OPEN)].SOPP specificity risk (5)
where: UR = user risk
OPEN = indicator of control by the user of misuse of participation in
assets or guarantees, on the basis of the supplier’s openness to inspection
(’open book contracting’)
SOPP = indicator of opportunism on the part of the supplier
Formula (4) shows that to eliminate hold-up risk, the supplier has the following
strategic options:
- avoid opportunism (UOPP=0), e.g. by doing business only with family
or close friends, or clan members, or with firms with a reliable reputa-
tion for low opportunism
- demand full financial participation or guarantees, or a combination of the
two from the user (GUAR+PART=1)
- do not engage in specific investment (SPEC=0)
According (5), the user has the following strategic options to eliminate hold-up
risk:
- avoid opportunism (SOPP=0)
- refuse to yield financial participation or guarantees (GUAR+PART=0)
- demand full control of misuse of guarantees (OPEN=1)
aspect could be included explicitly in the specification of the model, for example by
specifying that the maximum for the variable PART is not 1 but 1/2, on the assumption
that when it exceeds 50%, ownership passes to the user. However, at this point we prefer
to keep the model as simple as possible.
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Possible worlds and stereotypes
The central question for this research is the following:
Can the stereotypes of Western and Japanese contracting be recon-
structed as Nash equilibria in some plausible worlds, how efficient are
they, and is there an alternative that is better than both, in any plausible
world?
By ’plausible worlds’ we mean worlds that are realistic in the sense that they are
consistent and capture the core characteristics of worlds that exist, have existed
or may soon exist in some significant part of the world. One world is designed
to give ’Western contracting’ a chance of being an appropriate strategy, and a
second world is designed to give ’Japanese contracting’ a chance.
We now specify the stereotypes of Western and Japanese contracting and
’possible worlds’, in terms of values of the parameters in the models (2,3,4,5).
Subsequently we analyse what Nash equilibria obtain in those worlds, and see
whether they correspond to Western and Japanese contracting.
Our reconstruction of the ’Western’ and ’Japanese’ stereotypes in terms
of the variables from the model are as follows:
Western contracting: PMCOS = OPEN = PART+GUAR = SPEC =
UTRAN = STRAN = 0; MULCUS = MULSUP = 1. In other words:
Users do not grant margins to suppliers, suppliers do not engage in open
book contracting, users do not supply guarantees to cover specific invest-
ments by the supplier, the supplier does not engage in specific invest-
ments, there is no transfer of competence between them, and they engage
in multiple sourcing and multiple supply.
Japanese contracting is characterized as the opposite: PMCOS = OPEN
=
GUAR+PART = UTRAN = STRAN = 1; MULCUS = MULSUP = 0.
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Users and suppliers work closely together, allowing mutual profit,
covering for each other’s risks and mutually transferring know-how, and
they engage in exclusive relations (single sourcing; single supply). To
prevent misunderstanding: single sourcing and supply mean exclusive-
ness only for the duration of a given model of a given product. For
different models, a given input is likely to be sourced from among
different suppliers, to maintain incentives for ongoing improvement and
to keep monitoring the accomplishments in the market more widely
(Kamath & Liker, 1994).
The possible worlds that we propose as plausible ones are the following:
The world of the clan (W1): Here there is no opportunism (SOPP =
UOPP = 0), due to actors being tied together in clans, with pervasive
trust based on norms, values and rules, kinship relations, social control
or the need to maintain reputation (cf. Ouchi, 1980; Nooteboom, 1994).
This eliminates hold-up risk (see 4, 5), and this world thereby becomes
something of a ’degenerate’ case.
This world can also be used to represent the situation where agents accept hold-
up risk even where it is not eliminated by lack of opportunism.
The ’Fordist world’ (W2): standard products and stable markets and
technology. In this world there is no global competition, little need for
product differentiation, integrated firms, and a focus on price, cost and
economy of scale. There is advantage in the flexibility, bargaining
position and varied contracting with multiple partners. Due to stability
and homogeneity of perceptions there is no great need for learning by
transfer from other firms. In terms of the earlier discussion: EECS is not
relevant. In terms of model parameters it is characterized as follows: for
both U and S: s > d; m > t,v,j. This world is expected to favour ’Wes-
tern contracting’.
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The ’world of efficient quality’ (W3): High quality is required in terms
of close fit to specifications of differentiated products. Due to differenti-
ated products there is limited economy of scale, and there is a premium
on specific inputs and corresponding assets, and close cooperation
between supplier and user, for optimal use of complementary compet-
encies. Turbulence, in terms of change of markets and technology, is
limited, so that learning from many outside partners is not essential. In
terms of the model parameters: for U and S: d > s; t,j > m,v. This world
is expected to favour ’Japanese contracting’. Risk of spill-over exceeds
the benefits of transfer:
r > t+v+j.
The world of ’raplex: rapid change and complexity’ (W3): intense
competition in global markets, differentiated products (in both input and
output markets), fast technological development. In this world, like the
previous one, there is a need for specific investments to produce differ-
entiated products, but in addition all forms of learning from outside
partners are important (EECS): d, t, m, v, j are all important and the
benefits from transfer exceed the risk of spillover: t+v+j > r. Within this
world we recognize special cases, where the risk of spill-over is small
from three different causes:
’radical speed’ (W4a): change is so fast, that the life cycle of products
is shorter than the development time of new products. Here spill-over
does not matter: by the time that sensitive information reaches a com-
petitor, through linkages in the network of one’s partner it is obsolete.
’monitoring against spill-over’(W4b): there are technologies to monitor
what happens to competence transferred so that their spill-over can be
controlled.
’radical differentiation’ (W4c): competing producers are so radically
differentiated that they cannot greatly benefit from information that spills
over from them.
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This world is designed to capture conditions that are presently emerging in the
industrialized world. In this world we are curious to see what equilibria come
out, as some ’Third way’ next to the ’Western’ and ’Japanese’ forms of contract-
ing, and to see in what respects it differs from those two.
Outcomes
We now use game theory for a derivation of Nash equilibria, which are inter-
preted as ’generic forms of contracting’, in each of the possible worlds specified.
A major question in a model of this type is how to weigh risks against
returns. As shown, risks of bargaining and spill-over were integrated as costs in
the functions of net revenue (3,4). Hold-up risk is treated separately, with risk
being either zero or unity; either absent or complete. In this setting, in the
determination of equilibria we focus on outcomes in case of risk aversity, where
agents first exclude strategies that yield (full) hold-up risk, and then go for
maximum returns. However, we also discuss what outcomes are under accept-
ance of risk.
In W1 (clan world) we have:
The advantage of W1 is that there can be dedicated products (SPEC = 1) without
the need for measures of ’governance’ to protect against hold-up risk
(PART+GUAR). Also, in this world of mutual trust risks of spill-over are likely
to be small, either because partnership is restricted (MULCUS = MULSUP = 0),
or even if there are multiple partners risk of spill-over is limited. Spill-over may
still occur accidentally, but not due to opportunism or the use of sensitive
information from the partner as a hostage. But restricted partnership also implies
a weakness, because it entails that the scope for learning is limited. The clan
regime only works if no one can defect and get out (’hit and run’), and there is
no outside competition. In due course, this is expected to lead to lack of
innovation and backwardness. In this world there are several outcomes, depend-
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ing on the model parameters, as follows5:
clan contracting. It is characterized by the following parameter values.
SOPP = UOPP = 0; PMCOS = OPEN = UTRAN = STRAN = 1.
If s > d: SPEC = 0 and MULCUS = 1; RET = 1+s+m+t+v+j, risks are
zero.
If d > s: SPEC = 1 and PART+GUAR = 1; RET = 1+d+m+t+v+j, risks
are zero. Here RET indicates returns for both S and U
These outcomes also obtain in other worlds in the case that agents accept hold-
up risk.
In W2 (’Fordist world’) we have:
Since scale is more important than product differentiation (s > d), the highest
returns are reached (according to (2) and (3)) for: SPEC = 0 and MULCUS = 1.
Since there are no specific investments there is no need for guarantees:
PART+GUAR = 0 (see (4)), and therefore there also is no need for S to be open
in order to provide control of such guarantees for U (OPEN = 0; see (5)). But
according to (1) this precludes STRAN = 1. U will then set MULSUP = 1, to
obtain benefit m. According to the definition of W2 (m dominates remaining
parameters; in particular mU > vU) this is higher than the benefit that U would
have obtained from STRAN = 1 combined with MULCUS = 1, so there is no
reason for U to get STRAN = 1, which would require OPEN = 1 (1). This in
spite of the fact that S could afford to do that without losing bargaining position,
without needing a margin granted by U (PMCOS = 0), since he can maintain
that with the threat of shifting to a different partner (MULCUS = 1) (see (2)).
Thus we arrive at the only Nash equilibrium in W2:
5 We hesitate to discuss these outcomes in terms of Nash equilibria, because it is
arguable that they do not apply in this world. Non-cooperative game theory analyses the
utilization that agents make of opportunities to take opportunistic action. But in the
present ’clan world’, trust prevails, and trust may be defined as the inclination not to
employ opportunities for opportunism, even though one may have a material interest in
doing so (Nooteboom, 1994c).
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Standard products with multiple partners and no transfer (’Western
form’). In model parameters: PMCOS = OPEN = STRAN = UTRAN =
PART+GUAR = SPEC = 0; MULCUS = MULSUP = 1. RET = 1+s+m.
Note that this is identical to our reconstruction of the stereotype of ’Western
contracting’, so that we can conclude:
In the Fordist world Western contracting yields an efficient Nash equilib-
rium.
in W4 (raplex: rapid change and complexity, with low risk of spill-over relative
to the benefits of learning), there is no reason why agents should not set the
relevant parameters to achieve ’full learning’ (m+t+v+j): STRAN = UTRAN =
MULSUP = MULCUS = 1. By (1) this requires OPEN = 1, but according to (2)
the loss of bargaining position by S that this might entail is averted by MULC-
US = 1, and there is no need for a guaranteed margin for S (PMCOS = 0). To
achieve advantages of differentiated product requires SPEC = 1, but to eliminate
hold-up risk for S (4) this requires PART+GUAR = 1, but to eliminate hold-up
risk for U (5) this requires OPEN = 1. Thus we arrive at:
Cooperation with multiple partners and full learning: SPEC =
PART+GUAR = OPEN = SPEC = STRAN = UTRAN = MULSUP =
MULCUS = 1; PMCOS = 0.
We call this form of contracting the ’Third way’, since it presents an alternative
to the stereotypes of Western and Japanese contracting.
This is a Nash equilibrium: given the conditions of the world considered, and the
parameters chosen by the partner, no-one can improve his position.
In W3 (efficient quality) we run into problems: there the ’Japanese form’ does
not emerge as a Nash equilibrium, and thus our expectation here is not fulfilled.
We spend a separate paragraph on the issues involved.
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Problems with Japanese contracting
In W3 (efficient quality), our expectation was that Japanese contracting would
constitute an efficient equilibrium. Let us consider that possibility.
Since in this world product differentiation is more important than scale,
the aim is SPEC = 1. For S to eliminate the hold-up risk involved (4), he
requires guarantees (PART+GUAR = 1), but (5) then U requires the opportunity
to monitor S for misuse of such guarantees (OPEN = 1). This also opens the
possibility for the transfer of competence by S (STRAN = 1) that is important in
this world. In this world spill-over risks dominate the benefits of learning. To
eliminate that risk for S (2) this requires that U does not engage in multiple
partnerships (MULSUP = 0). In this world the return from joint development (j)
dominates remaining parameters; in particular j > m. Therefore UTRAN = 1, and
to eliminate spill-over risk for U (3), this requires MULCUS = 0.
The alternative would have been UTRAN = 0 combined with MULCUS
= 1, which together with STRAN = 1 would have yielded U the return v, but
would have led S to set STRAN = 0, to avoid spill-over risk, so that U would
lose j, and the loss would have exceeded the gain m (j > m). Since OPEN = 1,
and MULCUS = 0, according to (2) not to lose bargaining position S requires U
to grant him a margin (PMCOS = 1). Thus we arrive at the Japanese form of
contracting:
Cooperation in exclusive partnerships (’Japanese form’). PMCOS =
OPEN = SPEC = PART+GUAR = STRAN = UTRAN = 1; MULSUP =
MULCUS = 0;
RET = 1+d+t+j.
Given the conditions of world W3 this form of contracting is efficient, but as we
will demonstrate below, it does not constitute a Nash equilibrium.
The first problem is that we are in a prisoner’s dilemma (PD) situation:
from the position indicated both parties are tempted to engage in multiple
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partnerships, in order to gain additional benefit (m). But this creates risks of
spill-over (2,3), and to eliminate this, transfer of competence is stopped (STRAN
= UTRAN = 0), and in W3 the gain (m) is less than the loss (j), so that both
sides are worse off. Yet this is what agents will choose, for fear that if one does
not and the partner does, one loses too much.
An opportunity to get out of the PD arises in a repeated game, by threat-
ening an end to the relation if the partner does not maintain an exclusive
relation. This may yield mutual cooperation in maintaining exclusiveness by ’tit-
for-tat’ or some equivalent procedure (Axelrod, 1984).
But there is another problem that cannot be solved. Why would U accept that he
must provide a guaranteed margin to S? Suppose that he does not, and puts
PMCOS = 0? Then returns would be as follows:
SRET = 1-b+dS+tS+jS; URET = 1+b+dU+tU+jU (6)
In an attempt to prevent this, S may threaten to revert to multiple customers
(MULCUS = 0), to restore bargaining position6. But is this a credible threat? To
eliminate spill-over risk U would set UTRAN = 0, and to capture benefit m he
would set MULSUP = 1, and to protect himself against spill-over risk S would
set STRAN = 0. Returns would then be as follows:
SRET = 1+dS+mS; URET = 1+dU+mU (7)
The threat by S to revert to this is credible only if it would make him better off.
This is the case only if:
6 An alternative is to threaten to close himself to inspection by U (set OPEN = 0).
But this is even less credible than setting MULCUS = 1, because he would pay a double
price for that. The first is that U would withdraw his guarantees (PART+ GUAR = 0),
and then S would have to stop specific investments (SPEC = 0), so that both sides would
lose the advantage of differentiated products. The second is that it would prevent transfer
(STRAN = 0), which would induce U also to withdraw his transfer (UTRAN = 0), and
both sides would then revert to multiple relations (MULSUP = MULCUS = 1), and
thereby lose the benefits from transfer.
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b>tS+jS-mS (note that in the present world W3 tS and jS dominate mS) (8)
But b, which denotes the loss that S may incur as a result of loss of bargaining
position, can be influenced by U. U could refund S so as to lower b to just
below tS+jS-mS. Then condition (8) is not satisfied, and it is better for S to
accept the loss according to (6). Substituting b = tS+jS-mS, we then find:
SRET = 1+dS+mS; URET = 1+dU+tU+jU+tS+jS-mS (9)
In other words: U can appropriate all the benefits from transfer (t) and joint
production (j), and we wind up at the equilibrium:
One-sided benefit in exclusive cooperation, with OPEN = SPEC =
PART+GUAR = STRAN = UTRAN = 1; PMCOS = MULSUP =
MULCUS = 0;
SRET = 1+dS+mS; URET = 1+dU+tU+tS+jU+jS-mS
Is this, rather than the original reconstruction, the reality of Japanese contract-
ing? Let us call it the ’modified Japanese form’.
One way to avoid this result is to assume that tS+jS < mS, so that (8) is
fulfilled. But that means a departure from W3: we no longer have t and j > m
for both U and S. At least for S there is less benefit in transfer from U and joint
production than from having multiple partners. Let us define world 5 (W5) as a
world where: d > s; m > t,v,j. The corresponding equilibrium would be:
Differentiated products with multiple partners and no transfer, with
PMCOS = UTRAN = STRAN = 0; OPEN = PART+GUAR = SPEC =
MULCUS = MULSUP = 1; RET = 1+d+m.
We might consider yet another world (W6), where for U the benefit of transfer
and joint production does exceed the benefit from multiple partners, but for S it
does not: d > s for U and S; mS > tS+jS; tU+jU > mU. Since transfer from U to
S is of no value to S, S might as well engage in multiple partnerships. That
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enhances the value of S as a source to U. By offering a side payment e, U could
get S to cooperate in transferring competence to U. Then returns would be as
follows:
SRET = 1+dS+mS+e; URET = 1+dU+tU+vU-e (10)
How large would the side payment e be? S could threaten not to give the
transfer to U (STRAN = 0). In that case U would respond by engaging in
multiple partnership (MULSUP = 1), and returns would be as follows:
SRET = 1+dS+mS; URET = 1+dU+mU (11)
As a result, S could push the value of e up to just below the difference in return
to U:
e = tU+vU-mU (12)
The outcome would thus be:
Differentiated products with leading supplier, with U benefiting from a
one-sided transfer from a supplier who is a valuable source of compet-
ence and maintains multiple customers, but the supplier appropriating
most of that benefit: PMCOS = UTRAN = MULSUP = 0; OPEN =
PART+GUAR = SPEC = STRAN = MULCUS = 1; SRET = 1+dS+mS-
+tU+vU-mU; URET = 1+dU+mU
A final possibility to try and ’save’ the Japanese form is to assume that there is
no risk of the supplier losing bargaining position if he is open to the user (OPEN
= 1) and has no multiple customers (MULCUS = 0): in (2,3) b = 0. We label
this world W7. This might be interpreted as a situation where the product or
competence offered by the supplier is so strong and unique that he can effective-
ly threaten not to engage upon the relation at all. Or in other words: the supplier
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has a strong monopoly. But then he would not need a guarantee for margin
either, and we would still have PMCOS = 0, rather than 1, as specified in the
original ’Japanese form’. In W7 the outcome would be:
Differentiated products with monopolistic supplier, with OPEN = SPEC
= PART+GUAR = STRAN = UTRAN = 1; MULSUP = MULCUS =
PMCOS = 0. RET = 1+d+t+j
Our conclusion is:
The ’Japanese’ form of contracting, in its original reconstruction (picked
up from the applied literature) is dubious, in the sense that with our
model we have not been able to design a world where a guaranteed
margin from the user to the supplier is part of an equilibrium. Thereby
we have not been able to reconstruct the ’Japanese form’ as a viable
practice. Cooperative relations in exclusive partnerships with mutual
transfer either deteriorate to appropriation of the benefits by the user, or
require monopoly on the part of the supplier, or shift to one-sided
transfer from a leading and technologically independent supplier,
Game tree
We can now piece together the tree for the game in extended form, as illustrated
in figure 1. To limit complexity we do not include the worlds that were added
later (W5, W6, W7). Also, paths that do not lead to equilibrium are truncated.
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figure 1: game tree
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The conclusions are of course only valid within the constraints set in the
specification of the model. Two characteristic assumptions in the model are
assumptions of asymmetry:
- specific investments arise only on the side of the supplier, if they do
- the supplier runs a risk of loss of bargaining power if he does not satisfy
any of the following conditions: unique product offering of high quality,
closure to inspection by the user, access to alternative customers
These features have been chosen because they appear in descriptions in the
applied literature (e.g: Lamming, 1993; Kamath & Liker, 1994).
Another characteristic is a focus on the aversion of (full) risk of ’hold-up’.
Perhaps this is a relic from standard TCE, which focuses on hold-up risk, but it
does seem in accordance with observations that firms set great value on evading
too much dependence and the corresponding risk of hold-up.
The model aims to express all the key issues from the theory of TCE, extended
with a perspective of learning of different sorts.
Formal reconstructions have been made of the stereotypes of ’Western’ and
’Japanese’ forms of contracting. Plausible worlds have been specified in which
these forms seem relevant.
The analysis yields the following results:
- The stereotype of ’Western contracting’ is found to be an efficient Nash
equilibrium in the ’Fordist world’. It is efficient in the sense that it
yields maximal benefits if benefits from transfer (t) varied learning (v)
and joint development (j) are zero, which is consistent with this world
view.
- The stereotype of ’Japanese contracting’ is found not to be an efficient
equilibrium in the world of ’efficient quality’, which was designed to
give this form a maximal chance. Exclusive relations of mutual transfer
and joint development in the production of differentiated products tend
to fall back in the appropriation of the benefits by the user, with the user
failing to guarantee a margin for the supplier. Does this represent the
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reality of Japanese contracting? Of course, one may attempt to adjust the
model or invent different worlds in a further attempt to reconstruct the
’Japanese form’ as defined before.
- In the ’raplex’ world of rapid change and complexity, where product
differentiation is more important than scale and learning is important, in
all forms (m, t, v, j > 0), both the Western and (modified) Japanese
forms are surpassed in efficiency by the ’Third Way’: mutual transfer
with multiple partners and full learning. However, this requires either
that learning is so important that any risk for spill-over is accepted, or
that speed of change is so fast as to eliminate spill-over risk, or that
firms develop a technology of monitoring against spill-over. Of course,
the latter condition of monitoring for spill-over is easier specified than
fulfilled. It would entail some ’flagging’ of information transferred to the
partner.
The ’Third Way’ resembles Western contracting in its orientation to multiple
partnerships, and the absence of guarantees for supplier margin (price-minus
costing). It resembles Japanese contracting in its orientation towards specific
investments with guarantees, open book contracting, mutual transfer of compet-
ence and cooperation in development.
A familiar question in game theory is how equilibria are attained: by anticipation
and calculation, bargaining, trial and error,or evolution. Evolution seems most
likely here, and this seems to agree with history. In the West, the form of
’Western contracting’ evolved in a ’Fordist world’. Once evolved, the form is
difficult to change, because it has become embedded as ’normal practice’. A
generation of buyers has been trained to go for minimum price. It is difficult for
them to adopt a practice where price becomes a boundary condition rather than
the central objective, guarantees are given to cover specific assets, the focus is
on optimal usage of joint expertise, specifications are not a dogma but are
subject to comment, improvement and initiative from the supplier, and gains
from improvement are shared. They find it difficult to accept such a break of
principles, and are not trained to have sufficient competence to implement them.
’Japanese contracting’ has evolved from a different perspective on markets and
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efficiency. The Japanese may have become so used to exclusive contracting, in
closed networks of relationships (’Keiretsu’), that they find it difficult to widen
their perspective to different partners and mutual monitoring for spill-over.
However, on the basis of empirical evidence, if not the present analysis, practi-
tioners from both sides may be moved to change their ways, to adjust to the
present ’raplex’ world of global markets.
Some conclusions for policy are the following:
- there is no single most efficient and strategically viable solution (in the
sense that it constitutes a Nash equilibrium) in all possible worlds.
- The Western form was good in the Fordist world, but not in the present
world of global markets
- The Japanese form appears to less equitable than is described in the
applied literature: it falls back in lack of guarantee of supplier profit and
expropriation of benefit by the user. Apart from this asymmetry in the
distribution of surplus, joint efficiency is higher than in the Western
form, when markets require a shift from a focus on scale to a focus on
differentiated products and mutual use of competence between partners,
but it offers insufficient learning in the present world of ’raplex’ global
markets.
- The raplex world of global markets requires a Third Way. But this is
viable only if speed of change (in markets and technology) is radical or
a technology is developed to monitor spill-overs. It resembles the
Japanese way in its orientation to openness, specific assets covered by
guarantees, and mutual transfer of competence between partners, and this
requires a transformation of practice in the West. However, it is closer to
the Western perspective in its orientation to multiple partners. The Japan-
ese would need to open up their more exclusive relations.
There are many opportunities for further research:
- explore alternative specifications of the model; perhaps in further
attempts to reconstruct the original specification of the ’Japanese form’
as a Nash equilibrium
- exploit the rich source of hypotheses that are conditional on certain
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worlds, to test them in empirical work
- relax the extremes of dichotomous variables, in a more continuous
analysis
- in such an analysis, make an explicit trade-off between returns and hold-
up risk
- extend the analysis of interaction to multiple partners in a network
- allow for lack of information on strategies and outcomes
- make an explicit model of the development of different forms in differ-
ent worlds towards evolutionary equilibria
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